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Abstract
We apply the idea of relation contracting to a very simple problem
of regulating a single-product monopolistic ¯rm when the regulatory
instrument is a ¯xed-price contract, and quality is endogenous and
observable, but not veri¯able. We model the interaction between the
regulator and the ¯rm as a dynamic game, and we show that, provided
both players are su±ciently patient, there exist self-enforcing regula-
tory contracts in which the ¯rm prefers to produce the quality man-
dated by the regulator, while the regulator chooses to leave the ¯rm a
positive rent as a reward to its quality choice. We also show that the
socially optimal self-enforcing contract implies a distortion from the
second best, which is greater the more impatient is the ¯rm and the
larger is the (marginal) e®ect of the contractual price on the pro¯ts
the ¯rm would make by deviating from the o®ered contract. Whenever
the punishment pro¯ts are strictly positive, even if the ¯rm were in-
¯nitely patient, the optimal contract would ensure a Ramsey condition
but with positive pro¯ts to the ¯rm. Our result also illustrates that,
whenever the ¯rm's output has some unveri¯able component, optimal
regulatory lag in ¯xed-price contract should be reduced to limit the
reward of the ¯rm's opportunistic behaviour.
JEL Numbers: L13, L50.
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The quality of goods and services provided by regulated ¯rms is an ex-
tremely sensitive issue: indeed, how to regulate quality has been a subject
widely explored since the early days of the economics of regulation (Spence,
1975, Sheshinsky, 1976). Quality has many distinctive features: for in-
stance, it may be di±cult to observe, it has a non-deterministic component,
consumers' preferences towards it may be di±cult to observe. Our focus
here is on unveri¯ability: unveri¯ability occurs whenever a variable cannot
be proven in front of a court and, as a consequence, cannot be contracted
upon. In regulated industries it is often the case that a quality dimension of
the regulated ¯rm's output is not veri¯able: possible examples are courtesy
to the customers, voltage of electricity provided in a particular moment,
noise of a call, and so forth.
When quality is not veri¯able, the regulated ¯rm cannot simply be di-
rectly rewarded or penalized for the levels of service quality provided. This
implies that the regulatory tools developed by the existing literature and
commonly applied in practice may turn out not to be very e®ective. Theo-
retically, optimal contracts under asymmetric information may provide the
¯rm incentives to supply quality which are intrinsically in con°ict with those
to reduce cost (La®ont and Tirole, 1993). On more applied grounds, the reg-
ulatory instruments commonly in use, such as quality standards and links
between the quality provided and his allowed revenues or prices, are typically
able to in°uence only those quality dimension which are readily veri¯able
(Waddams Price et al., 2008; De Fraja and Iozzi, 2008).
In this paper we suggest an alternative way of regulating quality, based
on the idea of relational contracts.1 These are informal agreements and
unwritten codes of conduct that are sustained by the value of future rela-
tionships, and are applicable in the cases where the outcome of a repeated
1See, among the others, Bull (1987), MacLeod and Malcomson (1989), Baker et al.
(2002), MacLeod (2003), Levin (2003), Rayo (2007), Fuchs (2007), MacLeod (2007) and
Iossa and Spagnolo (2009)
1relationship is based on some unveri¯able variables. This type of contract
¯ts in naturally with the nature of the interaction between the regulator
and the regulated ¯rm. This is a relationship which is typically repeated
over time, and in which both parties have quite large discretionary space of
manoeuvre, are well informed on many variables a®ecting the outcome of
the relationship, even if part of this knowledge cannot be proven in court or
be written in a contract, and in which both parties may have mutual gains
from concerted behaviour.
We apply the idea of relation contracting to a very simple problem of reg-
ulating a single-product monopolistic ¯rm when the regulatory instrument
is a ¯xed-price contract, and quality is endogenous and observable, but not
veri¯able. Since quality is not veri¯able, the regulator cannot include the
quality dimension in the regulatory contract she o®ers to the ¯rm; however,
we consider the possibility that the regulator can use its discretionary pow-
ers in choosing the regulatory contract to impose informal punishments to
restrain the ¯rm's quality choice. More speci¯cally, the regulator discre-
tionary sets the regulated price to underpin an informal agreement in which
the regulated ¯rm is allowed some positive pro¯ts only if some target quality
measure is met.
We model the interaction between the regulator and the ¯rm as a dy-
namic game, and we show that, provided both players are su±ciently patient,
there exist self-enforcing regulatory contracts in which the ¯rm prefers to
produce the quality mandated by the regulator, while the regulator chooses
to leave the ¯rm a positive rent as a reward to its quality choice. Despite
this result being an application of the Folk theorem in a repeated sequential
game, it is nevertheless of interest in that it illustrates, in a way previously
unexplored in the literature, a way in which the regulator can use its only
instrument, the constraint on the (veri¯able) price chosen by the ¯rm, to
elicit from the ¯rm the (unveri¯able) desired level of quality.
We also characterize the optimal contract, that is the self-enforcing con-
tract which induces the highest social welfare. We show that, under normal
2circumstances, this contract implies distortion from the second best. We
¯nd that this distortion is greater the more impatient is the ¯rm and the
larger is the (marginal) e®ect of the contractual price on the pro¯ts the ¯rm
would make by deviating from the o®ered contract. Moreover, the pro¯ts
the ¯rm obtains under the optimal contract are clearly positively correlated
to the pro¯ts it would obtain when punished for a deviation from such a
contract: if the punishment pro¯ts were strictly positive, even if the ¯rm
were in¯nitely patient, the optimal contract would entail a Ramsey condi-
tion of tangency between the isowelfare and the isopro¯t, but would still
grant positive pro¯ts to the ¯rm.
Since the distortion with respect to the second best of our optimal con-
tract is larger the smaller is the discount factor, our paper also makes a con-
tribution to the issue of the optimal regulatory lag in ¯xed-price contract.
According to the received literature, when the ¯rm's cost is exogenous, there
is a simple trade-o® in setting the timing between price reviews: the longer
is the regulatory lag, the higher is the incentive the ¯rm has to undertake
cost-reducing e®orts but also the higher is the probability of allocative in-
e±ciency arising from the excessive pro¯ts (Armstrong et al., 1994; and
Armstrong et al., 1995). Instead, our result illustrates that, in case the
¯rm's output has some unveri¯able component, an increase in the frequency
of the price revision reduces the ine±ciency of the optimal contract since
diminishes the reward of an opportunistic behaviour by the ¯rm.
This paper is clearly related to the literature on quality regulation, re-
cently presented in the excellent survey by Sappington (2005). Price cap
regulation plans give the ¯rm insu±cient incentive to deliver the socially
optimal level of service quality. Therefore, these schemes typically incor-
porate explicit rewards and penalties to ensure the delivery of desired (and
observable) levels of service quality (Waddams et al., 2008). De Fraja and
Iozzi (2009) propose an extension of the traditional Laspeyres price cap
mechanism (Vogelsang and Finsinger, 1979) where the dynamic nature of
price cap regulation allows the regulator to write a price constraint which
3gives the ¯rm the correct trade-o® between price and (observable) qual-
ity and induces it to set, in the long run, the optimal price and quality
pair. Unveri¯ability of quality is explicitly taken into account by the op-
timal regulation literature: in a static context, La®ont and Tirole (1991)
shows that the power of the optimal incentive scheme has to reduced (rel-
atively to the case of exogenous quality) to limit the ¯rm's perceived cost
of supplying quality. Auray at al. (2008) extend the analysis of incentives
in quality regulation to a dynamic framework, albeit restricting the analysis
to the case of observable quality. More closely related to our paper is Dalen
(1997), who analyses a two-period model in which the regulator must decide
between low and high-powered incentive scheme according to the revealed
information provided by the ¯rm's past performance. He shows that o®er-
ing a low-powered incentive contract reduces the value of keeping private
information on own e±ciency to secure future information rent. Our paper
is also complementary in some sense to Lewis and Sappington (1991) who,
by dealing with unveri¯able quality in a procurement problem, identify the
conditions under which veri¯ability would increases the welfare of both the
buyer and supplier. Therefore, they conclude that, when these conditions
arise, both parties would be likely to agree on institutional structures that
facilitate third-party veri¯cation. We extend the scope of their conclusion
since we show that, when an institutional structures facilitating third-party
veri¯cation does not exist, or it is too costly, the buyer (regulator) and the
supplier (¯rm) might still ¯nd convenient to ¯nd an informal agreement that
would make both parties better o®. Indeed, the relational contract analyzed
in our paper can allow this kind of agreements.
This paper is also related to the recently growing and cross-¯eld litera-
ture on relational contracts. Since most of our results are readily applicable
to the case of repeated procurement, our paper is linked to Klein and Le²er
(1981), Kim (1998), Doni (2006), Calzolari and Spagnolo (2009) (see also
Che (2008) for a survey). A ¯rst attempt to introduce relational agreements
in repeated public procurement is due to Klein and Le²er (1981). More
4recently, Kim (1998), Doni (2006) and Spagnolo and Calzolari (2009) study
the incentive of relational contracts to deliver non-contractible quality in
procurement repeated auctions with more than one supplier. As in our pa-
per, they show that an optimal strategy for the buyer to enforce unveri¯able
quality is leaving future rents to the contractor. However, given their appli-
cation of relational agreements to repeated auctions, the punishment for an
opportunistic behaviour is the termination the relationship, what certainly
is not applicable in our regulator-single ¯rm relationship.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. The equilibria of the static and the dynamic game are characterized
in section 3, which also contains two examples that shed further light on
the nature of the optimal contract arising in the dynamic game equilibrium.
Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
We analyse an in¯nite horizon game in which two parties, a regulator and
a monopolistic ¯rm, interact at dates t = 0;1;:::;1. Let ± be the discount
factor common to the ¯rm and the regulator.
The monopolist produces one good, whose demand is x(p;q), with p
denoting the price of the good and q its quality; we assume that p 2 R+
and q 2 Q ´ [q;q] µ R++. The ¯rm's technology is described by the
cost function c(x;q). The ¯rm's pro¯ts are therefore given by ¼(p;q) =
x(p;q)p ¡ c(x(p;q);q).
The demand function is assumed to have standard properties: for all
quality levels q, it is continuous and twice di®erentiable, with @x
@p < 0 and
@x
@q > 0 whenever x > 0. The cost function satis¯es, plausibly, @c
@x > 0 and
@c
@q > 0. To avoid corner solutions, we assume that limq!q
@c
@q = 0 and that
limq!q c(x;q) = +1: a marginal increase of quality is costless when quality
is at its minimum and maximal quality is in¯nitely costly.
The regulator's objective function is given by the social welfare function
V (p;q) which is assumed to be quasi-convex, continuously di®erentiable and
5satisfy the following plausible conditions:
@V (:)
@p · 0, and
@V (:)
@q > 0.2 The
social value of not having the good produced by the ¯rm is equal to V0; we
assume that having the good produced is always bene¯cial for the society,
so that V (p;q) > V0 for any value of p and q.
The dynamic game we consider is an in¯nite repetition of the following
sequential stage game:
Stage 1: the regulator makes an o®er F = fp0;q0g in which it asks the ¯rm to
produce a good of quality q0 and sets the market price p0 at which the
good has to be sold in the market;
Stage 2: the ¯rm chooses whether or not to accept the contract; if the ¯rm does
not accept the contract, the game ends, otherwise the game proceeds
to the following stage;
Stage 3: the ¯rm chooses the e®ective quality level q00; at the end of this stage
the regulator observes q00, and the payo®s V (p0;q00) and ¼(p0;q00) are
realized.
Observe that, because of the assumption on the regulator's reservation
value, the regulator will always make o®ers such that ¼(p0;q0) ¸ ¼0, where
we denote with ¼0 the ¯rm's reservation pro¯ts, which we normalise to zero.
This implies that the second stage of the game can be ignored in the rest
of the analysis, since the ¯rm will never ¯nd it pro¯table to reject the o®er
and quit the game.
We analyse a game of complete but imperfect information. However,
despite the realisation of price and quality being fully observable by both
players, quality is not enforceable in a court of law, in that the regulator
cannot impose any directly enforceable penalty on the ¯rm when it observes
q0 6= q00.
2We purposely do not impose any further restriction on the consumers and regulator's
preferences. A less general but equally natural setting would be with many consumers
with quasi-linear preferences and a benevolent regulator. In such a setting, many standard
properties, such as the equivalence between consumers' surplus and their welfare and Roy's
identity would hold; none of these properties would however be necessary for our results.
6Before proceeding into the analysis of the game, we state the following:
De¯nition 1. Let the following de¯nitions hold:
a) for any price p, let b q(p) = argmax
q
¼(p;q);
b) for any price p, let b ¼(p) = ¼(p; b q(p));
c) let p0 be the price such that b ¼(p0) = 0.
In words, b q(p) is the quality level that delivers the highest pro¯t to the
¯rm for any possible price. We assume it to exist and be unique. Similarly,
b ¼(p) is the pro¯t the ¯rm can make, for any given price, when it optimally
chooses its quality. Also, p0 is the price level which ensures that the ¯rm
obtains zero pro¯ts when it freel chooses its quality level, given this price.
We assume this price to exist and be unique.
We also state:





s.t. ¼(p;q) ¸ 0
In words, pR and qR are the Ramsey price and quality pair which max-
imises (static) social welfare subject to a nonnegativity constraint on the





and that, at pR and qR, the nonnegativity constraint holds as an equality.
We assume pR and qR to exist, to be unique and di®erent from pM and qM,
where pM and qM are the pro¯t maximising price and quality values.
Figure 1 gives an illustration of these De¯nitions. It depicts the price-
quality cartesian plane; the solid curves are the isopro¯t lines and the dashed
curves are the isowelfare lines, upward sloping because welfare is increasing
7in quality and decreasing in price.3 The pair fpM;qMg is the pro¯t maximis-
ing price and quality pair and fpR;qRg is the second best optimal pair: at
this point, the zero-pro¯t isopro¯t line is tangent to the isowelfare map. At
prices p0 and p1, the ¯rm, freely choosing its quality level, selects b q(p0) or,
respectively, b q(p1): at the price and quality pair fp0; b q(p0)g the ¯rm makes
zero pro¯ts.
Fig. 1 - The static game
3 Equilibrium
3.1 The static game
We start by noting that, in a static context, unveri¯ability of the quality
provided by the ¯rm implies that the regulator cannot enforce the second
best quality level. In other words, since the regulator can only observe but
not punish any choice of quality other than the mandated level, we are back
3Isowelfare lines are drawn convex coherently with the quasi-convex assumption made
for the social welfare function. When the regulator is a benevolent utilitarian and con-
sumers' preferences are quasi-linear, quasi-convexity would simply re°ect the quite natural
assumption that consumers' willingness to pay for increases in quality is higher when qual-
ity is low than when quality is already high; for further discussion, see De Fraja and Iozzi,
2009.
8in the context of price regulation with endogenous quality, ¯rstly analysed
by Spence (1979). It is then straightforward to characterize the equilibrium
of the stage game described above. In the last stage of the game, for any
price mandated by the regulator, the ¯rm chooses the pro¯t maximizing
quality level b q(p). Anticipating this, in the ¯rst stage the regulator makes
an o®er FS ´ fpS; b q(pS)g, where pS comes as the solution of the following
problem:4
max
p V (p;q) (3)
s.t. ¼(p;q) ¸ 0
q = b q(p):
The properties of this equilibrium price are described in the following
Proposition:
Proposition 1. The price pS o®ered by the regulator in static equilibrium
of the stage game has the following features:




@pS , which implies b ¼(pS) = 0, and




@pS , which implies b ¼(pS) > 0.
Proof. To solve problem (3), set up the Lagrangean incorporating the second
constraint




















@pS = 0. Instead, if ¹ > 0,




@pS + ¹ @b ¼
@pS = 0. Since b ¼(p) is
monotonically increasing in p whenever p < pM, this establishes the result.
4We take b q(p
S) as the quality level included in the o®er F
S only for the sake of
de¯niteness; indeed, any quality level could be part of such an o®er because, in this static
setting, the regulator anticipates that the ¯rm will always choose its pro¯t maximizing
quality level and that it cannot prevent or punish this behaviour.
9Proposition 1 illustrates that the optimal static o®er is such that the
¯rm may obtain strictly positive pro¯ts.5 When the optimal o®er implies
strictly positive pro¯ts, a marginal increase in the price induces an increase
in the quality provided by the ¯rm (i.e.
@b q(pS)
@pS > 0). The optimal o®er then
equalizes the marginal negative direct e®ect on welfare of a price increase
with the marginal positive indirect e®ect, due to an increase in the quality




@pS ). On the other hand, when the optimal
o®er implies zero pro¯ts, the direct positive e®ect on welfare of a price re-
duction would outplay the e®ect going through a change in quality; however,
the non-negativity constraint on the ¯rm's pro¯ts limits a further price de-
crease. Notice that in this case, at the equilibrium, the sign of the marginal
change in quality due to a marginal price change (
@b q(pS)
@pS ) is indeterminate.
It should be also noted that, as already pointed out in the existing literature
(Spence, 1979; and De Fraja and Iozzi, 2008), at the optimal o®er, equilib-
rium quality is always underprovided, in the sense that there always exists
a Pareto improving increase in quality. On the other hand, no clear-cut
conclusion can be reached on the magnitude of pS relatively to the second-
best price: it is indeed even possible that the equilibrium price is above the
second best price.
This result is illustrated in Figure 2. In both panels, the locus aa0 is
made of the optimal quality choices for the di®erent price levels, i.e. b q(p).
Taking this as a constraint, the regulator chooses its optimal one-shot price
pS to maximise social welfare. Depending on the local relative slope of
iso-welfare (¡ @V
@pS= @V
@b q(pS)) and the sign of
@b q(pS)
@pS which determines the two
possible situations in Proposition 1, the optimal price may be given by a
tangency condition between the isowelfare and the locus aa0, as in panel
(a), or may be a corner solution, as in panel (b). Clearly, given the many
possible shapes the locus aa0 can take on, restrictions are necessary to ensure
that the solution to the regulator's problem is unique or, more restrictively,
5Note that the solution to problem (3) need not be unique. In case of multiple solutions,
for reasons that will be clearer thereafter, we select p




Fig. 2 - the optimal static contract
3.2 The dynamic game
We now turn to illustrate that, under unveri¯able quality, a relational con-
tract may ensure a social welfare higher than the one which would prevail
in a static context. In line with Levin (2003), to characterise this relational
contract we study the dynamic game, introduced in section 2, given by an
in¯nite repetition of the sequential stage game discussed in the previous
section.
A regulatory relational contract under unveri¯able quality is a strat-
egy pro¯le such that, given the o®er FC ´ fpC;qCg, the parties take the
following actions in each period
² the regulator makes the o®er FC;
² the ¯rm chooses qC.
This regulatory relational contract is self enforcing if the strategy pro¯le
is a perfect equilibrium of the repeated game.
The de¯nition leaves unde¯ned two elements of the players' strategies,
the o®er FC and the parties' behaviour o® the equilibrium path. We make
them precise concentrating on the following grim trigger strategies for the
players:
11² regulator: the regulator begins the game by making the ¯rm an o®er
FC and keeps making this o®er if the ¯rm has always chosen quality qC
in previous periods; otherwise, it reverts inde¯nitely to its equilibrium
strategy in the stage game;
² ¯rm: the ¯rm chooses the quality qC whenever the regulator has of-
fered FC in the past; otherwise, it reverts inde¯nitely to its equilibrium
strategy in the stage game.
Notice the somehow di®erent nature of the two strategies, due to the
sequential nature of the stage game; while a choice of the quality level dif-
ferent from qC is detected by the regulator only in the following period, an
o®er di®erent from FC by the regulator is immediately observed by the ¯rm
and triggers a reaction in the same period it is made.
The Folk theorem ensures the existence of an equilibrium in these trigger
strategies, provided that the players are su±ciently patient.6 Formally, this
requirement of \su±cient patience" is equivalent to the following condition:
1
1 ¡ ±




Observe also that, in principle, an incentive compatibility constraint
need to to hold also for the regulator. However, the regulator's IC is also
always satis¯ed provided it gains from o®ering FC, that is V (pC;qC) ¸
V (pS; b q(pS)). Indeed, there is no short-term gain for the regulator in devi-
ating from its the trigger strategy, because this is observed and punished by
the ¯rm in the same period before payo®s are realized.
Condition ICF simply imposes limits on the nature of the o®er FC.
However, since it is the regulator to choose the o®er, it will select the socially
optimal among the ones which ensure that the ICF holds. We now turn to
6Sorin (1995) proves that the Folk theorem proved by Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)
for simultaneous repeated game also applies to sequential repeated games provided that
full dimensionality condition (FDC) holds. This requires that the convex hull of the set of
the feasible payo® vectors of the stage game must have dimension equal to the number of
players, or equivalently a nonempty interior. FDC is clearly satis¯ed in our model. Abreu
et al. (1994) and Wen (1994, 2002) further weaken this requirements.
12studying the characteristics of the regulator's optimal o®er which ensures
the self-enforcing nature of the relational contract. We let F¤ ´ fp¤;q¤g be
















We can now state the main result of the paper:
Proposition 2. The price and quality pair fp¤;q¤g solving the problem de-
¯ned by (4) and (ICF) satis¯es the following conditions:
@V=@p¤
@V=@q¤ =

























































¼(p¤;q¤) ¡ b ¼(p¤) ¡
±
1 ¡ ±










@q¤ = 0, which clearly contradicts the hypothesis
that the ¯rst best is out of reach. Therefore, @L
@¸ = 0 in (10), which gives
(6). Also, dividing (8) by (9), we get (5).
13Conditions (5) and (6) de¯ne the optimal equilibrium price and quality
pair and illustrate the way it departs from Ramsey conditions. Condition (5)
di®ers from the standard Ramsey condition for two important factors: ¯rst,
the role of the ¯rm's intertemporal preferences and, second, the marginal
e®ect on the deviation pro¯ts of a change in the contractual price, that is
the way a change in the optimal price a®ects the willingness to deviate of the
¯rm. To interpret (5), note that, in the Ramsey condition of tangency, the
marginal rate of substitution between price and quality is equated between
the regulator and the ¯rm. On the contrary, here, at the social optimum,
the regulator ¯nds it optimal to o®er a price lower than the one which
would ensure the tangency between isopro¯t and isowelfare (at the minimum
pro¯t level for the ¯rm). This is because it takes into account the fact
that the higher is the price o®ered, the higher are the ¯rm's pro¯ts in case
of deviation. The greater is this e®ect the smaller will be the regulator's
willingness to substitute away price with quality, because of the risk in
inducing a deviation by the ¯rm. Clearly, these considerations play a role
in the regulator's choice of the optimal contract which is more important
when the ¯rm is more \tempted" to deviate, that is when the ¯rm is the less
patient. This implies that the distortion from a Ramsey tangency condition
typical of the optimal o®er is greater the smaller is the ¯rm's discount factor.
Only if the ¯rm were in¯nitely patient and/or the e®ect of the optimal price
on the deviation pro¯ts were null, the optimal contract would correspond to
a tangency condition between the isowelfare and the isopro¯t, as with the
standard Ramsey condition.
On the other hand, condition (6) illustrates the level of the pro¯ts the
regulator has to ensure to the ¯rm. These increase not only with the pro¯ts
the ¯rm obtains by deviating from the regulator's o®er, but also with the
pro¯ts the ¯rm would obtain in the punishment phase. Combining condi-
tions (5) and (??), it is also possible to see that, whenever the punishment
phase entails strictly positive pro¯ts for the ¯rm, even if the ¯rms were
in¯nitely patient, the best possible contract would satisfy the Ramsey tan-
14gency condition, though on an isopro¯t corresponding to strictly positive
pro¯t.
Our result has some interesting implications in terms of optimal length
of the regulatory period.7 We have so far interpreted ± simply as an exoge-
nous parameter expressing the players' intertemporal preferences. Standard
textbook analysis illustrates how ± depends instead on a much wider range
of circumstances, such as the frequency of interaction, the probability of
continuation, and so forth. In particular, ± increases with the frequency
of interactions in each given period since it reduces the value of the per-
period interest rate. Therefore, as our equilibrium outcome becomes closer
to a Ramsey solution as ± increases, our result has the immediate policy
prescription to suggest an increase in the frequency of the price revision in
regulatory settings in which unveri¯ability plays a role.
To illustrate further the nature of the optimal o®er to be made to the
¯rm and to shed light on the e®ect on it of the time preferences and of
the interplay between the "cooperative" pro¯ts and, in contrast, the pro¯ts
arising during the deviation and the punishment phase, we use two examples
with speci¯c functional forms. In particular, the ¯rst example includes an
optimal punishment with zero-pro¯t while in the second the punishment
pro¯t is positive.
3.3 Example 1
Demand function is given by x(p;q) = (4+q)¡p. Social welfare, de¯ned as




(4 + q ¡ p)2: (11)
The ¯rm's cost function is c(q;x) = (1 + q2)x, and pro¯ts are given by
¼(p;q) = (4 + q ¡ p)(p ¡ (1 + q2)): (12)
7See Armstrong et al. (1994) and Armstrong et al. (1995). The basic idea explored by
the literature so far is that there is a trade-o® in setting the timing between price reviews
when the ¯rm's cost is exogenous. On the one hand, the longer is the regulatory lag, the
higher is the incentive the ¯rm has to undertake cost-reducing e®orts; on the other hand,
the longer is the regulatory lag, the higher the probability of allocative ine±ciency arising
from the excessive pro¯ts.
15The monopolist unconstrained pro¯t maximising choices are given by pM =
23
8 and qM = 1
2, which give pro¯ts equal to ¼M = 169
64 . For any given price,
the optimal quality choice for the ¯rm is










13 ¡ 5p + p2 (13)
The (static) second best price and quality pair, found by solving problem








which give social welfare equal to V (pR;qR) = 169
32 and pro¯ts equal to 0.
Notice the the socially optimal quality level is also chosen by the uncon-
strained monopolist, something which the previous literature has already
recognised to be possible (see, for instance, Tirole, 1989). The punishment
price and quality pair is pP = 1 and qP = 0 with ¼(pP;qP) = 0.
Table 1: Optimal contract in Example 1
± p¤ q¤ pP ¼(p¤;q¤) ¼(p¤; b q(p¤)) V (p¤;q¤)
0.1 1.0344 0.0637 1 0.0918 0.1020 4.5884
0.2 1.0658 0.1233 1 0.1548 0.1935 4.6739
0.3 1.0948 0.1792 1 0.1933 0.2762 4.7568
0.4 1.1216 0.2321 1 0.2108 0.3514 4.8374
0.5 1.1466 0.2821 1 0.2101 0.4201 4.9158
0.6 1.1699 0.3297 1 0.1933 0.4833 4.9922
0.7 1.1917 0.3751 1 0.1625 0.5417 5.0669
0.8 1.2123 0.4185 1 0.1192 0.5958 5.1398
0.9 1.2317 0.4601 1 0.0646 0.6461 5.2113
0.999 1.2498 0.4996 1 0.0007 0.6926 5.2806
Unfortunately, it is not possible to solve for the optimal price and quality
pair analitically and we then have to resort to numerical methods. Table
1 provides the values of p¤, q¤ and pP for di®erent values of the discount
factor ±; the same Table also provides the equilibrium level of static pro¯ts
and social welfare.
16Fig. 3 - Example 1
These same values are illustrated in Figure 3. The points lying southwest
to the (static) socially optimal pair fpR;qRg are the optimal o®er, fp¤;q¤g,
drawn for di®erent values of ±. The higher is ±, the closer to the second best
are both price and quality included in the optimal contract; on the other
hand, the lower is ±, the closer are the contractual pairs to the pair f1;0g,
the equilibrium of the static game and also the o®er by which the regulator
may punish any deviation from the optimal contract. Through the optimal
o®er when ± = 0:5, we draw both the isowelfare and the isopro¯t to illustrate
the distortion (i.e. the di®erence between the ¯rm's and regulator's marginal
rate of substitution) typical of the optimal contract.
This example neatly illustrates the nature of the optimal o®er. This has
two important features: ¯rst of all, it entails a distortion from the second-
best in that the marginal rate of substitution between price and quality is
di®erent between the ¯rm and the regulator. As shown in Proposition 2,
17this distortion is greater the lower is the value of ± and the larger is the
marginal e®ect of a change in the contractual price on the deviation pro¯ts.
In this example though, both distortions tend to disappear as the value of
± goes to 1: the more patient is the ¯rm, the smaller are the extra pro¯t
necessary to convince it to adhere to the optimal contract and, also, the
higher is the gain from the deviation. This result however depends on the
possibility to punish the ¯rm with a zero-pro¯t contract in case of deviation:
the following example illustrates the relevance of the punishment phase for
the level of social welfare the optimal contract is able to deliver.
3.4 Example 2
Demand function is given by x(p;q) = 2q ¡ qp. This implies that aggregate




(2 ¡ p)2q (15)
The ¯rm's cost function is c(q;x) = q2 + 1
2x, so that its pro¯ts are given
by
¼(p;q) = p(2q ¡ qp) ¡ q +
1
2
qp ¡ q2; (16)
The monopoly unconstrained price and quality are given by pM = 5
4 and
qM = 9
32, which gives pro¯ts equal to ¼M = 81
1024. For any given price, the











By solving the problem (3), we ¯nd that the (static) second best price








which gives rise to social welfare equal to V (pR;qR) = 2187
8129 and, clearly,
pro¯ts equal to zero. As in the previous example, we have to resort to
numerical methods, whose results are given in Table 2, identical in its nature
to the previous one.
18Table 2: Optimal contract in Example 2
± p¤ q¤ pP ¼(p¤;q¤) ¼(p¤; b q(p¤)) V (p¤;q¤)
0.1 0.9492 0.2695 0.8750 0.05458 0.0557 0.1488
0.2 0.9617 0.2906 0.8750 0.05486 0.0575 0.1566
0.3 0.9693 0.3066 0.8750 0.05429 0.0585 0.1629
0.4 0.9747 0.3201 0.8750 0.05333 0.0592 0.1683
0.5 0.9789 0.3319 0.8750 0.05214 0.0598 0.1730
0.6 0.9823 0.3426 0.8750 0.05079 0.0602 0.1774
0.7 0.9852 0.3524 0.8750 0.04933 0.0606 0.1815
0.8 0.9877 0.3615 0.8750 0.04778 0.0609 0.1852
0.9 0.9898 0.3700 0.8750 0.04617 0.0612 0.1888
0.999 0.9917 0.3780 0.8750 0.04451 0.0614 0.1922
These values are illustrated in Figure 4, where the same notation as in
the previous Figure is used.
The main result from Table 2 is that, when the \punishment"o®er gives
positive pro¯ts to the ¯rm, the second best is never enforceable; as a matter
of fact, for any ±, the optimal price and quality are always distorted respec-
tively upward and downward. In particular, it is possible to see that, even
thought the ¯rm was in¯nitely patient (± = 1) (or the frequency of the price
revision is su±ciently high ), the Ramsey condition of tangency is satis¯ed
though with a strictly pro¯t and an isowelfare always lower than the second
best value. This means that the punishment is not harsh enough to ensure
the second best and time-preference adjustment itself cannot eliminate dis-
tortions as in the Example 1. Social welfare indeed is always lower than his
second best value.
19Fig. 4 - Example 2
4 Conclusions
This paper de¯nes the optimal ¯xed-price contract the regulator needs to
o®er a regulated ¯rm when the quality is endogenous, observable but not
veri¯able. We suggest that, using the discretionary powers of the regulator
and exploiting the repeated nature of the interaction between the regulator
and the ¯rm, there exist self-enforcing agreements which may help over-
coming the di±culties due to the unveri¯able nature of quality. We show
that, in an in¯nitely repeated contractual relation, if the regulator rewards
the ¯rm by means of a high regulated price when it delivers a mandated
quality level and punishes it when it deviates from such a level by reducing
the regulated price in future periods, the optimal contract improves upon
the level of static social optimum. This contract however typically entails
distortions from the quality and price of second best, unless the punishment
is so harsh to induce zero pro¯t. What this paper predicts in terms of regu-
20lation policy is that su±ciently short contracts including harsh punishments
could induce the regulated ¯rm to deliver a price and quality combination
su±ciently close to the second best.
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